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Viewing objects can result in automatic, partial activation of motor plans associated with them—“object
affordance”. Here, we recorded grip force simultaneously from both hands in an object affordance task
to investigate the effects of conﬂict between coactivated responses. Participants classiﬁed pictures of
objects by squeezing force transducers with their left or right hand. Responses were faster on trials
where the object afforded an action with the same hand that was required to make the response (con-
gruent trials) compared to the opposite hand (incongruent trials). In addition, conﬂict between coacti-
vated responses was reduced if it was experienced on the preceding trial, just like Gratton adaptation
effects reported in “conﬂict” tasks (e.g., Eriksen ﬂanker). This ﬁnding suggests that object affordance
demonstrates conﬂict effects similar to those shown in other stimulus–response mapping tasks and
thus could be integrated into the wider conceptual framework on overlearnt stimulus–response associ-
ations. Corrected erroneous responses occurred more frequently when there was conﬂict between the
afforded response and the response required by the task, providing direct evidence that viewing an
object activates motor plans appropriate for interacting with that object. Recording continuous grip
force, as here, provides a sensitive way to measure coactivated responses in affordance tasks.
Keywords: Object affordance; Conﬂict; Stimulus–response mapping; Continuous force.
Appropriate, goal-directed interaction with our
environment requires a close relationship between
perception and action. Indeed, some argue that
object representations in the brain are not simply
perceptual but also include possibilities for action.
Gibson (1986) introduced the notion of “affor-
dances”: properties of an object that somehow auto-
matically activate possible actions towards that
object. The effects of object affordance have been
demonstrated using both behavioural and imaging
methods. For example, functional imaging studies
have revealed that medial frontal motor regions,
such as the supplementary motor area (SMA),
can be activated even when observers simply look
at graspable objects (e.g., Grèzes & Decety,
2002). Reaction time (RT) studies have also
demonstrated that responses to an object are facili-
tated when they are congruent with actions relevant
for interacting with that object. For example,
Tucker and Ellis (1998) showed participants
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upright or inverted by responding with either the
left or the right hand. Critically, objects were posi-
tioned so they readily afforded an action with one of
the hands—for example, a teapot with the handle
on the right affords a grasping action with the
right hand. Even though the action afforded by
the object was irrelevant to the classiﬁcation task,
responses were faster if they were made with the
same hand as the afforded response (“congruent”
trial) than if they were made with the opposite
hand (“incongruent” trial).
Object affordance versus stimulus–response
(S–R) mapping tasks
Although Gibson (1986) considered object affor-
dances to be somehow “automatic”, it is important
to consider the possible mechanisms underlying
affordance effects. Object affordance tasks require
participants to categorize target objects and make
their response according to a given rule (e.g., to
classify the object as upright or inverted).
Congruency effects have also been reported for
tasks using very different stimulus–response (S–R)
mappings to those employed in affordance tasks.
For example, in the inﬂuential Eriksen ﬂanker
paradigm (e.g., B. A. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974),
participants make speeded responses to a centrally
presented target stimulus—for example, an arrow,
ﬂanked by nontarget (distractor) arrows. The trial
is “congruent” if the target and ﬂankers are associ-
ated with the same response (e.g., ,,,,,) and
“incongruent” if target and ﬂankers are associated
with different responses (e.g., ..,..).
Responses are slower when there are incongruent
compared to congruent ﬂankers because there is
conﬂict between coactivated responses to both
target and ﬂankers.
Such coactivation of responses occurs in ﬂanker
tasks because the arrow stimuli have been mapped
to particular responses; also ﬂanker arrows auto-
matically activate the responses associated with
them even though they are not the response
required to the target. In object affordance tasks,
perhaps the object—or part of the object—primes
the observer to respond in a particular way.
The primed response can be either congruent or
incongruent with the response required to interact
with the object. Therefore, it might be possible to
consider affordance effects within a more general-
ized conceptual framework whereby automatic
sensorimotor activation is elicited by previously
learnt S–R associations.
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate
the relationship between object affordance effects
and general S–R associations. In particular, how
affordance might compare to Simon effects
(Simon, 1969) has been examined by pitting
these two against each other, often in a single
experiment (e.g., Iani, Baroni, Pellicano, &
Nicoletti, 2011; Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi,
& Nicoletti, 2010; Symes, Ellis, & Tucker,
2005). For example, Symes and colleagues reported
three experiments in which participants made
spatial responses to objects that simultaneously
varied in both orientation (affordance effect) and
location (Simon effect). These studies showed
that dissociable Simon and affordance effects can
co-occur. However, such ﬁndings do not necess-
arily clarify the potential extent of overlap
between the mechanisms producing Simon (and
other S–R mappings) and affordance effects.
One way to investigate whether affordance
might ﬁt into a wider framework of S–R associ-
ations would be to examine whether affordance
effects show the same behavioural phenomena as
those reported in other S–R tasks. The nature of
the mechanisms responsible for producing con-
gruency effects in S–R tasks (e.g., Simon effects)
has been investigated by plotting the size of the
congruency effects as a function of response
speed, known as a “delta” plot. Delta plots from
classic Simon tasks typically show initial positive
effects that level off—or even become negative—
as response times get longer (e.g., De Jong,
Liang, & Lauber, 1994; see also van den
Wildenberg et al., 2010, for a review). This
pattern is usually explained in terms of suppression
of unwanted responses activated by irrelevant
stimuli by cognitive control mechanisms. The inhi-
bition takes time to develop (e.g., Ridderinkhof,
2002; see also Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998), and
so a pattern of facilitation followed by inhibition
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(Ridderinkhof, 2002).
As possible actions afforded by the environment
willoftenconﬂictwiththecurrentgoalsoftheobser-
ver,itfollowsthatanymotor responsesautomatically
primed by object affordances might also need to be
suppressed. Such inhibition of actions automatically
elicited by object affordances might be expected
to result in decreased congruency effects as RTs
increase in affordance experiments—yielding delta
plots similar to those shown in Simon effects.
However, this is not the result usually reported.
Instead, affordance effects typicallybuild upover
time so that the size of the effect increases as RTs
get longer and dissipate rapidly once the object
has disappeared (e.g., Cho & Proctor, 2010;
Derbyshire, Ellis, & Tucker, 2006; Iani et al.,
2011; Pellicano et al., 2010; Tucker & Ellis,
2001; see also Phillips & Ward, 2002). Thus, affor-
dance studies often show “positive” or “ﬂat” delta
plots. Importantly, “negative” delta plots are not
always produced by S–R mapping tasks that are
assumed to involve inhibition: Flat or even positive
delta plots have emerged from some Eriksen
ﬂanker studies (Wylie et al., 2009) and from
Simon tasks when the S–R mapping is more
complex than a simple left–right button press
with the left–right hand (e.g., when response
hands are crossed or when stimuli and responses
are arranged vertically; Wascher, Schatz, Kuder,
& Verleger, 2001).
As well as evidence of cognitive control over
coactivated responses that acts within a trial in
S–R mapping tasks, there is also evidence of cogni-
tive control over competing responses that acts
between trials (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, & Cohen, 2001). For example, interference
from ﬂankers is weaker if an incongruent trial is
preceded by another incongruent trial than if it is
preceded by a congruent trial—the so-called
“Gratton” effect (e.g., Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1992; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag,
Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988). It has been suggested
that the conﬂict experienced on an incongruent trial
ramps up levels of cognitive control, which in turn
leads to reduced interference from ﬂankers if the
subsequent trial is also incongruent relative to if
the preceding trial had been congruent (e.g.,
Botvinick et al., 2001).
This pattern of trial-to-trial effects has been
reported for a range of S–R paradigms including
the Simon task (e.g., Wühr & Ansorge, 2005)
and the Stroop colour-word naming task (e.g.,
Egner & Hirsch, 2005), but to the best of our
knowledge has not been investigated in object
affordance. If object affordance effects ﬁt into a
wider framework of S–R associations, one might
expect them, too, to produce similar types of adap-
tation in the presence of conﬂict as is shown in
other S–R mapping paradigms.
Direct measurement of coactivated responses
Most experimental paradigms used to investigate
automatic sensorimotor activation (e.g., Simon,
Eriksen ﬂanker) have shown the effects of conﬂict
between coactivated responses indirectly by com-
paring response times for making manual button-
press responses. Longer RTs are usually explained
in terms of extra time required to resolve conﬂict,
and errors are typically infrequent. But these
button-press responses are an all-or-nothing,
binary measure. Small amounts of force applied
erroneously to the incorrect response button
might be insufﬁcient to trigger a response and
therefore escape detection. Thus, such binary
button-press measures might not be ideal for study-
ing the effects of cognitive control because they
cannot directly measure simultaneously activated
motor plans.
Conﬂict between coactivated responses has been
shown more directly by measuring responses that
are continuous—for example, using electromyogra-
phy (EMG) or event-related potentials (ERPs) or
by measuring response as continuous force in “con-
ﬂict tasks” (e.g., Burle, Allain, Vidal, & Hasbrouq,
2005; Coles, Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen, &
Donchin, 1985; C. W. Eriksen, Coles, Morris, &
O’Hara, 1985; Fournier, Scheffers, Coles,
Adamson, & Abad, 1997). For example,
C. W. Eriksen et al. (1985) had participants com-
plete a ﬂanker task while recording continuous
muscle activity (using EMG) simultaneously from
both arms. On incongruent trials, correct button
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for the opposite response—that is, appropriate for
the response associated with the ﬂankers on incon-
gruent trials. This provides direct evidence for sim-
ultaneous coactivation of responses associated with
the target and ﬂankers on incongruent trials.
To the best of our knowledge, continuous
measures of response have not yet been applied to
object affordance experiments. Here we introduce
a continuous-force measure to study affordances,
with participants making their responses by apply-
ing force to one of two transducers that recorded
continuous grip force applied from each hand.
This allows us potentially to detect whether a
healthy observer viewing an object activates motor
plans appropriate for interacting with that object,
even if those motor plans are not relevant for the
task. In addition, if object affordance effects are
simply another example of S–R mapping, then
one might expect them to produce similar types
of conﬂict adaptation shown in other S–R
mapping tasks. Therefore, one might anticipate
negative sloping RT delta plots and reliable
Gratton effects in a typical object affordance task,
just as they are shown in other S–R mapping tasks.
Method
Participants
A total of 25 healthy adults (17 female; age 19–32
years) took part after giving informed consent. All
participants self-reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and right-handedness (Edinburgh
handedness inventory; Oldﬁeld, 1971).
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli were displayed on a 21′′ CRT monitor
(1,024 ×768 pixels), which participants viewed
binocularly from 60 cm. Stimulus timing and pres-
entation was locked to the screen refresh rate of
100 Hz. Stimuli were presented using a PC
running Presentation software (Version 13.1;
http://www.neurobs.com, Albany, CA:
Neurobehavioral Systems). These were pictures of
10 household objects taken from the Object
Databank (courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Brown
University, retrieved May 10, 2010, from http://
www.tarrlab.org/) and Verfaillie and Bousten’s
3D object database (see Boutsen, Lamberts, &
Verfaillie, 1998; Verfaillie & Boutsen, 1995).
Objects were matched for orientation.
Five objects belonged in a kitchen (fork, frying
pan, knife, saucepan, spoon), and ﬁve in a toolbox
(chisel, pliers, saw, screwdriver, spanner). Images
subtended 10.6–17.3° horizontally and 2.8–5.3°
vertically. Objects presented were oriented with
their handles affording an action with the left or
right hand.
Participants’ responses were measured using two
specially designed devices, one held in each hand.
Participants held a rolled aneroid sphygmoman-
ometer cuff (Boso-clinicus I, ref: 030-0-111),
inﬂatedto20mmHg,connectedtoapressuretrans-
ducer.Theywereinstructedtosqueezetherolledcuff
inresponsetotheobject.Gripforcewasconvertedto
voltage, which was digitized and stored using a
LabJack U3 HV data acquisition device with
DAQFactory Express (version 5.82; Azeo Tech
Inc.) software. Data were sampled at 1,000 Hz.
Design and procedure
Before the experiment began, participants were
shown the pressure transducers and practised
making responses while observing the output
from the pressure transducers on a computer
screen. During the experiment, each trial began
with presentation of a black ﬁxation cross on a
white background (Figure 1). This cross subtended
1° ×1° and was presented in the centre of the
screen for 500 ms. Following a blank interval
(200 ms), the target object was presented at
screen centre for 2,000 ms. Depending on the
stimulus–response mapping given (counterba-
lanced across individuals), participants were
instructed either to respond with the left hand to
kitchen items and with the right hand to toolbox
items, or vice versa. Thus, the hand action afforded
by the object could be either “congruent” or “incon-
gruent” with the required response.
A blank intertrial interval (1,000 ms) was pre-
sented before the next trial began. Following a
short practice block (12 trials), the experiment
was arranged into four blocks of 64 trials, with
rests between blocks. There were an equal
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targets of each category (kitchen or toolbox) in
each block (including the practice block). Order
of presentation was shufﬂed randomly for each par-
ticipant, and which image of the target category was
presented was determined randomly and indepen-
dently on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants were
encouraged to respond as quickly as possible
while remaining a high level of accuracy, but no
response feedback was given to participants
during the experiment.
Data analysis
Continuous-force recordings were locked to stimu-
lus onset and epoched into periods of 2,500 ms,
beginning 500 ms before target onset. Data were
smoothed using a simple 5-point moving average
to reduce high-frequency noise. The resulting
waveforms were baseline corrected on a trial-by-
trial basis according to the average baseline activity
for each response device during the 200-ms presti-
mulus period on each trial.
A response (either correct or incorrect) was said to
have occurred in a trial if at any point after stimulus
onset until the end of the trial, the force measured
was greater than 3 standard deviations from the
mean force measured during the prestimulus baseline
period and was followed by at least 8/10 points that
also reached this threshold. Response onset time
(RT) was deﬁned as the ﬁrst point that satisﬁed
these criteria. Peak response was determined as the
maximum amplitude of the response made in a trial
that was surrounded by points on either side with
the same or lower amplitude.
Results and discussion
Overall reaction times are modulated by congruency
A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test revealed that there
was no reliable effect of trial congruency on peak
response amplitude (Wilcoxon signed ranks test,
Z=0.28, p..1). The effects of congruency on
the peak response amplitude measure are not ana-
lysed any further.
Median correct response times were calculated
separately for each condition (congruent or incon-
gruent) for each participant (Figure 2A). A
repeated measures t test on median RTs showed
that responses were signiﬁcantly faster for congru-
ent (507 ms) than for incongruent (523 ms) trials,
t(24)=3.49, p,.01. This result held when data
were further separated by responding hand
(average congruency effect in left hand: 16 ms;
right hand: 17 ms) or target type (average con-
gruency effect for kitchen objects: 18 ms; toolbox
objects: 15 ms; all ps,.05). This is consistent
with affordance effects previously documented
using button-press or switch-press responses (e.g.,
Figure 1. Illustration of a participant responding to the stimulus sequence presented on an example trial. Participants made a squeeze response
with either the left or the right hand to indicate whether the object presented belonged in either a kitchen or a toolbox. Each object was presented
so that it afforded an action with the left or right hand (all trial types were equiprobable).
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Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Vainio, Ellis, & Tucker,
2007).
RT distributional analysis
In order to further explore the time course of the
response time effect reported above, we carried
out analysis on the distribution of RTs. Trials
were divided according to trial congruency (congru-
ent or incongruent), rank ordered for each partici-
pant and then divided into four bins of equal size.
If the number of trials containing correct responses
did not divide perfectly by 4, bin sizes were rounded
to the nearest whole number. The median RT in
each bin for each condition was then calculated.
The difference in median RT for congruent and
incongruent trials gives an indication of the size
of the congruency effect for that part of the RT dis-
tribution. These median effect sizes were averaged
across participants and are shown in Figure 2B.
To examine whether the size of the congruency
effect changed as a function of RT, we conducted a
4 (quartile)×2 (congruency) repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the median RT
for each participant in each condition. As expected,
there were signiﬁcant effects of quartile, F(1.05,
25.16) =140.70, p,.01, with a Greenhouse–
Geisser correction employed due to a violation of
the sphericity assumption, and of congruency, F
(1, 24) =8.41, p,.01. Importantly, there was a
signiﬁcant interaction between the effects of quar-
tile and congruency, F(1.30, 31.12)=3.89,
p,.05, with Greenhouse–Geisser correction,
indicating that the size of the congruency effect
changed as a function of RT.
This ﬁnding is in line with other recent inves-
tigations into the time course of affordance effects
(e.g., Cho & Proctor, 2010; Tucker & Ellis,
2001). Thus, it seems that although object orien-
tation was irrelevant to the task in this exper-
iment, it continued to inﬂuence execution of
motor responses and shows no evidence of the
rapid decay that would be expected to result if
responses primed by affordance were suppressed,
as shown for typical Simon tasks (e.g., De Jong
et al., 1994).
Conﬂict history modulates congruency effects
Next we examined whether the effect of con-
gruency on a given trial was modulated by the con-
gruency of the preceding trial, as it is in traditional
“conﬂict” tasks such as Eriksen ﬂanker (e.g.,
Gratton et al., 1988), Simon (e.g., Wühr &
Ansorge, 2005), and Stroop tasks (e.g., Egner &
Hirsch, 2005). On each trial, it was possible for
the target object to be repeated from the
Figure 2. (A). Mean of median correct response times (RTs) were signiﬁcantly faster for congruent than for incongruent trials, which replicates
affordance effects reported using button presses. **Denotes p,.01. (B). Mean quartile compatibility effect sizes as a function of mean RT for
that quartile.
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trials). To avoid the possibility that any trial-to-trial
effects were produced by repetition priming of the
exact stimulus–response link from the immediately
preceding trial (see Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003),
trials in which the same object was repeated,
regardless of whether the action afforded by the
object was repeated or not, were removed from
analysis along with the ﬁrst trial from each block.
However, it should be noted that this does not
remove the possibility that there might have been
some featural or category overlap from the object
presented on the previous trial, which may in turn
have activated the same response.
The remaining data were entered into a 2 (pre-
vioustrialcongruency)×2(currenttrialcongruency)
repeated measures ANOVA to analyse median
correct RTs. There was a signiﬁcant interaction
between the effects of current trial and previous trial
congruency, F(1, 24)=7.55, p=.011 (interaction
shown in Figure 3). The form this interaction takes
is consistent with the usual pattern of Gratton
effects: The effect of conﬂict on trial n was greater
when trial n – 1 was congruent than when the pre-
vious trial was incongruent.
The conﬂict monitoring hypothesis (e.g.,
Botvinick et al., 2001) predicts that experience of
conﬂict on the previous trial results in an increase
in cognitive control in the subsequent trial—even
when the same stimulus–response links are not
repeated. A one-tailed, repeated measures t test
on our data supports this hypothesis: If the
current trial is incongruent, RTs are signiﬁcantly
faster if the previous trial was also incongruent
compared to if the previous trial was congruent, t
(24)=1.81, p,.05.
Direct evidence for automatic activation of afforded
responses
Trials containing responses from the erroneous
hand were infrequent, accounting for a little over
5% of trials, and there was no reliable effect of
trial congruency on overall error rate (Wilcoxon
signed ranks test, Z=–1.29, p..1).
However, grip force measurements potentially
allow us to observe some very small errors that
might not be detected using all-or-nothing
button-press measurements. Examples of individ-
ual trials containing errors are shown in Figure 4.
Here, we classiﬁed trials containing errors
(responses with the incorrect hand) into two types:
1. Uncorrected error trials (accounting for ∼19% of
all errors), which contained an above-threshold
response made by the incorrect hand and no
above-threshold response made by the correct
hand.
2. Corrected error trials (accounting for∼ 81% of
all errors), which contained above-threshold
activity for both correct and incorrect hands.
Many of these corrected errors showed very
small levels of response activity (see Figure
4C), which might not have been sufﬁcient to
produce an erroneous button press but are mea-
sureable using our force transducers, potentially
providing direct evidence for simultaneous
coactivation of responses.
We analysed data from uncorrected and corrected
error trials separately. There was no signiﬁcant
effect of trial congruency on the number of uncor-
rected errors made (Z=–0.42, p..1). However,
Figure 3. Mean of median response times (RTs) as a function of
current trial congruency and previous trial congruency. Results are
consistent with the conﬂict monitoring hypothesis—if the current
trial was incongruent, RTs are signiﬁcantly faster if the
immediately preceding trial was also incongruent than if the
previous trial was congruent.
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incongruent trials (mean number of errors=6) than
on congruent trials (mean number of errors=5;
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, Z=–2.25, p=.024).
This ﬁnding is consistent with the suggestion that
object affordances (partially) prime the observer to
interact with the object, even when the observer is
engaged in a different task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We simultaneously recorded continuous measures
of force from both hands to investigate the effects
of conﬂict between coactivated responses in a
classic object affordance task. Using this continuous
measure of response, we found that RTs were faster
if the (irrelevant) response afforded by the object
was congruent with the response required by the
task (Figure 2A). This is consistent with the
effect on response time reported in the affordance
literature (e.g., Derbyshire et al., 2006; Ellis &
Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Vainio
et al., 2007) and provides further evidence consist-
ent with the view that perceiving an object can par-
tially activate motor plans associated for interacting
with that object.
Using continuous grip force measurements we
also found that corrected erroneous responses
occurred more frequently on incongruent than on
congruent trials—that is, when there was conﬂict
between the action afforded by the object and the
action required by the task. These ﬁndings
provide direct evidence that viewing an object acti-
vates motor plans appropriate for interacting with
that object, even if those motor plans are not rel-
evant for the task. It is likely that small amounts
of erroneous grip force activity measured here
would not have been detected if participants had
responded via a button press, because they would
have been of insufﬁcient magnitude to cross the
threshold required to be measured. Therefore,
grip force measurements might provide a more sen-
sitive means for measuring motor plans activated by
object affordances.
Affordance versus other S–R mapping tasks
We set out to investigate possible similarities
between the congruency effects shown in a tra-
ditional object affordance task and those reported
in other S–R mapping tasks. Here we have shown
that the effect an afforded action has on responses
is modulated by experience of conﬂict between
Figure4. Examples of responseson individualtrialsshowingerrors.Figure 4Ashowsan errorresponsewiththeincorrect hand;Figures 4Band
4Cshowexamplesof incorrectresponsesthat were followedbyacorrectresponse.Figure4B showsatrialthat containsa largeerroneousresponse.
Figure 4C shows an example of one of the many trials where the error made was very small and might not have been detected using button-press
measures. The stimulus was presented at time zero.
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ing trial. Responses on incongruent trials were
reliably faster if they were preceded by another
incongruent trial rather than by a congruent trial.
This ﬁnding cannot be explained by a speeding of
responses by repetition of exactly the same S–R
linkage from the immediately preceding trial, as
trials containing the same object as that in the pre-
ceding trial were removed from analysis.
Instead, the effect of trial history reported here is
consistent with the view that experience of conﬂict
adjusts levels of control on subsequent trials
(Botvinick et al., 2001). Furthermore, medial frontal
areas that are active when observers look at objects
(Grèzes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis, & Passingham,
2003) have also been implicated in control over con-
ﬂict between coactivated responses (see Nachev,
Kennard, & Husain, 2008). The conﬂict adaptation
effects in object affordance shown here are similar to
those reported in other tasks showing automatic sen-
sorimotoractivation(e.g.,the“Gratton”effectsshown
in Eriksen ﬂanker and Stroop tasks). In fact, affor-
d a n c et a s k so f t e nu s eal a r g es t i m u l u ss e t ,w h i c h
make them well suited to investigating trial-to-trial
effects while reducing confounds between repeating
the exact same S–R linkage (which are often con-
founded in other tasks, e.g., ﬂanker). The Gratton
effects shown here suggest that object affordance
demonstrates conﬂict effects similar to those shown
in other stimulus–response mapping tasks and thus
perhapscanbeintegratedintotheframeworkofover-
learnt stimulus–response associations.
Finding that object affordance can show analo-
gous trial-to-trial (Gratton) effects to those
shown in other S–R mapping tasks (e.g., Eriksen
ﬂanker) suggests that the same control mechanisms
might be common to both tasks, and that object
affordance effects could be integrated into the
S–R literature. The evidence for control that is
shown in the Gratton effect here might be expected
to manifest in RT delta plots as a positive con-
gruency effect that decreases—or even becomes
negative—as RTs get longer (see van den
Wildenberg et al., 2010, for a review). However,
this was not the pattern of results reported here.
Rather, the RT delta plot showed no evidence
that congruency effects reduced as RT increased.
In fact, we found that the size of the congruency
effect increased as a function of RT.
It is not immediately clear why we would ﬁnd
evidence for cognitive control in the form of a
Gratton effect, but no evidence for control in the
form of suppressed responses in the delta plot.
Whether a decreasing delta plot slope is shown
will depend on the relative temporal properties of
this suppression. Therefore, one possibility is that
responses automatically activated by object affor-
dances are suppressed but that this suppression
occurs too late, or grows too slowly, for it to be
seen in the delta plot.
Alternatively, Boy, Husain, and Sumner (2010)
have recently emphasized a possible distinction
between proactive (prestimulus) and reactive (post-
stimulus) control. According to Boy et al., separate
control mechanisms underlie the Gratton effect
(proactive) and target–ﬂanker congruency effect
(reactive) in an Eriksen ﬂanker task. Thus, in the
present experiment, perhaps the (proactive)
control mechanisms driving the Gratton effect are
present and are distinct from the (reactive) mech-
anisms that would be expected to produce a nega-
tive sloping delta plot, which are absent here.
It should also be noted that positive delta plots
have emerged in other affordance tasks (e.g.,
Tucker & Ellis, 2001; see also Phillips & Ward,
2002), and as noted in the introduction, similar
ﬂat or positive delta plots have been shown in
S–R mapping tasks, which are believed to involve
some inhibitory mechanism. For example, positive
or ﬂat delta plots have been produced in Eriksen
ﬂanker (e.g., Wylie et al., 2009) tasks and also in
Simon tasks when the mapping between stimulus
and response is more complex than a simple left–
right button press with the left–right hands (e.g.,
when response hands are crossed or when stimuli
and response are arranged vertically; Wascher
et al., 2001).
Some investigators (e.g., Wascher et al., 2001;
Wiegand & Wascher, 2005) have suggested that
such positive or ﬂat delta plots are produced by con-
ﬂict between spatial “codes” that are activated for
the stimulus and the response, so that responses
are speeded when codes confer and are slowed
when there is conﬂict. Cho and Proctor (2010)
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affordance tasks as well as some Simon tasks
where the stimulus did not afford any action.
Therefore, Cho and Proctor suggested that increas-
ing RT functions shown in object affordance are
due to conﬂict between the spatial codes activated
by action-relevant stimulus properties and the
spatial codes for the response required by the
task, just as in complex Simon tasks.
What mechanisms drive so-called
“affordance” effects?
Thenatureofthemechanismsproducingaffordance
effectshasbeenatopicofrecentdebate,andthesug-
gestion that affordance effects might be based on
abstract spatial codes rather than activating
responses that are limb- or grasp-speciﬁc (as orig-
inally suggested by Gibson; 1986, see also Greeno,
1994; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001) is not new.
Several researchers have now reported reliable
within-hand affordance effects (e.g., Cho &
Proctor, 2010; Vainio, Ellis, & Tucker, 2006,
Experiment4),whichnotbeexpectedifaffordances
activated limb- or grasp-speciﬁc responses.
Furthermore, reliable congruency effects have also
been shown using responses made with crossed
hands (e.g., Phillips & Ward, 2002, Experiment
2), and even when making foot responses (Phillips
& Ward, 2002, Experiment 3), which would also
not be expected if objects afforded an action that
was speciﬁc for interacting with that object.
Other authors have rejected the idea that object
representations include possibilities for action at all.
Anderson, Yamagishi, and Karavia (2002) noted
that shifts of attention to the location of objects also
generate spatial response codes (the well-known
Simon effect, e.g., Simon, 1969). They reported
that response times were faster whenever that
response is spatially congruent with the most visually
salient part of the visual stimulus, regardless of
whether the stimulus was a graspable object or not.
This suggested that participants directed their atten-
tion to the most salient part of the objects and that it
wascongruencybetweentheresponseandthisshiftof
attention (not the action afforded by the object) that
wasresponsibleforthecongruencyeffectsreportedin
affordance tasks.
However, there are at least two important differ-
ences between Anderson and colleagues’ (2002)
experiment and other affordance experiments,
which raise the possibility that different effects are
being studied: (a) Anderson et al. used line draw-
ings of common objects as stimuli, which may
not have afforded actions in the same way as photo-
graphs or real objects as used in other affordance
experiments; and (b) participants made their
response according to the orientation of the stimu-
lus presented—therefore orientation was not task
irrelevant as it is in other affordance experiments.
Furthermore, reliable congruency effects have now
been reported in object affordance paradigms that
rely on object size, not orientation, to produce
robust effects (e.g., Derbyshire et al., 2006; Ellis
& Tucker, 2000; Ellis, Tucker, Symes, & Vainio,
2007; Tucker & Ellis, 2001). It is not clear how
the “attention directing” hypothesis put forward
by Anderson and colleagues can explain object
affordance effects such as these.
Of course, these different accounts for what
drives object affordance effects need not be
mutually exclusive: Perhaps graspable objects are
linked to particular actions precisely because obser-
vers have a wealth of experience directing their
attention to the graspable parts of objects, and
where those objects have been linked to those par-
ticular actions. As such, the highly overlearnt
associations between stimulus and response could
be automatically activated when the object is
viewed—resulting in apparent “affordance”
effects. Further studies are required to examine
the relationship between object affordance and
conﬂict between other S–R mappings.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we report that the effect of afforded
actions on responses is modulated by previous
experience of conﬂict in much the same way as
reported in other S–R paradigms (e.g., ﬂanker),
suggesting that object affordance could be con-
sidered as a type of highly overlearnt S–R
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MCBRIDE, SUMNER, HUSAINassociation. Furthermore, grip force measurements
allow detection of erroneous responses that could
escape detection by conventional button presses.
As such, they provide a sensitive means for measur-
ing the effects of simultaneously coactivated motor
responses in conﬂict tasks, including object
affordance.
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